Edith Cowan University

Research Online
Research outputs 2014 to 2021
2021

COVID-19 governance, legitimacy, and sustainability: Lessons
from the Australian experience
Michael Lester
Marie dela Rama
Julie Crews
Edith Cowan University

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013
Part of the Business Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, and the
Epidemiology Commons
10.22495/cgsrv5i1sip5
Lester, M., dela Rama, M., & Crews, J. (2021). COVID-19 governance, legitimacy, and sustainability: Lessons from
the Australian experience. Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review, 5(1), 143-153. https://doi.org/
10.22495/cgsrv5i1sip5
This Journal Article is posted at Research Online.
https://ro.ecu.edu.au/ecuworkspost2013/10883

Corporate Governance and Sustainability Review/ Volume 5, Issue 1, Special Issue, 2021

COVID-19 GOVERNANCE,
LEGITIMACY, AND SUSTAINABILITY:
LESSONS FROM THE AUSTRALIAN
EXPERIENCE
Michael Lester *, Marie dela Rama **, Julie Crews ***
* LongView Partners, Sydney, Australia
** Corresponding author, UTS Business School, Sydney, Australia
Contact details: UTS Business School, P.O. Box 123, Broadway NSW 2007, Sydney, Australia
*** Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia

Abstract
How to cite this paper: Lester, M.,
dela Rama, M., & Crews, J. (2021).
COVID-19 governance, legitimacy,
and sustainability: Lessons from
the Australian experience [Special
issue]. Corporate Governance and
Sustainability Review, 5(1), 143–153.
https://doi.org/10.22495/cgsrv5i1sip5
Copyright © 2021 The Authors
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (CC BY 4.0).
https://creativecommons.org/licens
es/by/4.0/
ISSN Online: 2519-898X
ISSN Print: 2519-8971
Received: 01.03.2021
Accepted: 16.04.2021
JEL Classification: O1, O2, P1, H1,
H5, H7
DOI: 10.22495/cgsrv5i1sip5
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It marshalled the government‘s delivery capacity to control the health
crisis and put in place measures to offset the induced economic and
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experience by applying a ―co-production‖ governance model that sees
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total deaths during the Second World War1.
America‘s daily death rate has peaked at 3,253
exceeding the terrorist toll of 2,996 from 9–11 and
expected to continue at that rate over in early 2021,
notwithstanding the commencement of its vaccine
distribution (Heavey, 2020). A series of early
mistakes in a rapidly evolving situation, political
struggles at many levels, rejection of expert advice,
and lack of national leadership, and denialism were
all contributing factors (Wright, 2021).
Across the Atlantic, in the UK, total cases were
just short of 4 million and the official COVID-19
death toll in Britain is over 112,000 (Worldometers,
2021). It remains to be seen whether its toll will rise

1. INTRODUCTION
In January 2021, the global count of COVID-19 cases
across 219 countries topped 103 million, total
deaths exceeded 2.2 million and countries began to
struggle with emerging more virulent mutations and
vaccine rollouts (Worldometers, 2021). Australia
ranked 8 among nearly 100 countries that
performed best in the handling of the pandemic
(Lang & Lemahieu, 2021) with total cases 28,823 and
total deaths of 909 (Australian Department of
Health, 2021).
In contrast, at the time of writing,
the COVID-19 tragedy unfolded in the USA with
27 million total cases, the highest number in
the world. Its total deaths of over 454,000
(Worldometers, 2021) have exceeded that country‘s

1

Total American military and civilian deaths were 418,5000 deaths.
See
the
US
National
World
War
Two
Museum
at
https://www.nationalww2museum.org/students-teachers/student-resources/
research-starters/research-starters-worldwide-deaths-world-war
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to match its 125,000 losses in the Battle of
the Somme during the First World War. A Briton is
nearly 40 times more likely than the average
Australian to die of COVID-19.
In terms of the response by the latter two
Anglo-American countries, the question that can be
asked is: “Why did so many have to die?” (Ball, Clark,
& Hinsliff, 2021).
Australia‘s response, tentative at the start of
January 2020, saw a states-based approach and
attack that demonstrated the strength of its federal
system in the absence of Commonwealth leadership.
In the state of Victoria, which saw its second wave
result in a disproportionate amount of deaths in
Commonwealth-funded aged care, its lockdown was
severe and enduring: ―Australia has exited its first
recession in almost three decades, with the economy
growing by a better than expected 3.3% in
the September quarter, reflecting authorities‘ adept
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic‖ (Smyth, 2020).
As the fog lifts from the pandemic, it is
becoming clear that the socioeconomic pain of
lockdown reaped a pandemic economic equilibrium
by the end of 2020.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 presents a crisis management
framework. Section 3 provides an overview of
the Australian
context.
Section 4
provides
the Australian health response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Section 5 summarises the Australian
government‘s economic response to the COVID-19
pandemic. Section 6 discusses the governance
capacity of the Australian government‘s response.
Section 7 reviews the governance legitimacy and
trust deficit in the Australian political culture and its
elites. Section 8 discusses the impact the COVID-19
pandemic has on sustainability in Australia. Finally,
the conclusion section (Section 9) summarises our
main arguments.

the course of the crisis. The pandemic challenges
institutions and values, while major decisions need
to be taken under deep uncertainty and public
measures have an experimental quality of trial
and error as new data and knowledge unfolds at
a rapid pace.

3. AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT
The Commonwealth of Australia has a multicultural,
immigrant population of 26 million people and is
a rich, stable, liberal democratic nation. It has
a Westminister-style representative government,
a federal constitution, an egalitarian culture of
opportunity tempered with individuality. It is among
the most highly urbanised countries but also
sparsely occupies a dry continent the size of
the contiguous states of the USA. Australia was
established as a British colony in 1788 dispossessing
the continent‘s first nations indigenous aboriginal
peoples and their continuous culture of over
60,000 years.
The Coalition Liberal National Country Party
Prime Minister, Scott Morrison, sees himself as
an ―ordinary bloke‖, loves his ―footie‖, identifies
with ―tradies‖ and adroitly manages his image as
―Scotty from marketing‖ befitting his previous
background as a marketing executive. His critics
portray him as strong on announcements and poor
on delivery (Feik, 2020). While there are elements of
the ‗populist‘ politician in his political appeal and
rhetoric, his economic policies have tended to
maintain
a
broadly
moderate
neoliberal,
market-facing, small government stance with
broadly conservative social values.
The government is under the sway of climate
deniers and vested commercial and fossil fuel
interests that continue among other things, to
politicise and paralyse any commitments to
an effective and timely commitment to transition
to a carbon-free economy (Hodder, 2009). Morrison
iconically walked into Parliament carrying a lump of
black coal touting fossil fuels but he has kept
Australia within the Paris Climate Accords. His
government has managed to weather a rolling series
of ―scandals‖ and despite strong public support, has
stonewalled attempts to legislate a federal
anti-corruption body (Bennett, 2020; Feik, 2021).
To date, Australia has avoided the worst of
the ―populist‖ and ―nationalist‖ reactions to
neoliberalism that have characterised the rise of
Trump and Johnson (Lester & dela Rama, 2018).
Under Morrison, Australia‘s successful response to
the COVID-19 crisis has displayed political and
economic resilience and adaptability displaying
a pragmatism not found in America and the UK as
they continue to be overwhelmed health-wise and
economically by the COVID-19 pandemic.
As a result of broad structural reforms during
the 1980s and 1990s, the Australian economy has
enjoyed three decades of continuous economic
growth. In the decade prior to COVID-19 economic
reform had lost any real momentum and structural
problems
continued
to
amass
unaddressed
(Pascoe, 2020).
Unemployment was increasing, wages growth
was flat, inequality was increasing, productivity
improvement
was
anaemic,
infrastructure
investment was lagging, the education and skills
training sectors were underperforming, housing

2. CRISIS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK
This paper
considers Australia‘s successful
COVID-19 response during 2020 from the point of
view of public governance capacity, legitimacy, and
sustainability. It examines the relationship between
governance capacity to deliver and governance
legitimacy for public acceptance as a joint process of
co-production. The governance dimensions of this
relationship of ―mutual trust‖ are discussed in terms
of leadership, social cohesion, transparency, expert
advice, communication, and outcomes. Successful
―crisis
management‖
and
sustainability
in
a pluralistic democracy are seen to rely upon these
dimensions of governance.
―Crisis management is most successful when it
is able to combine government capacity with
democratic legitimacy‖ (Christensen & Laegreid,
2020). Adopting this framework this paper explores
the Australian experience in successful COVID
management as the joint product or co-production
of the relationship between government and
the community (Brandsen & Honingh, 2016).
Administrative competence alone cannot deliver
results without the acceptance and compliance of
the community; a relationship built upon mutual
respect and trust.
There is a complex tradeoff between these two
dimensions of effective crisis management;
the relationship is also dynamic and can change over
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affordability declined, social housing was grossly
undersupplied, poverty was on the rise, and certain
sectors such as aged care, energy, and climate
change policies have been long-disputed and
politicised resulting in long-standing disarray
(Irvine, 2019). Monetary policy was exhausted with
interest rates that had been driven to all-time lows.
There was pressure pre-COVID-19 on a reluctant
government committed to surplus budgets and
reduced debt for fiscal policies necessary to
stimulate the economy. Structural reforms were
long overdue. There was a little political appetite
for reform.

systems. The health-based restrictions were
designed to ―flatten the first wave‖ and subsequent
waves of infection spread by limiting transmission:
the aim of this suppression was to avoid
overwhelming the capacity of the public health and
hospital systems. Elimination strategies were
variously adopted in cities, regions, and states. They
were broadly successful.
In taking this range of highly restrictive
health-based measures the federal and state
governments invoked the authority under their
legislated emergency powers, primarily in the hands
of state governments (McLean & Huf, 2020).
The effective exercise and acceptance of these
powers involve striking a delicate balance with
prevailing norms of the democratic process. Clear,
consistent, and transparent communication based
on
credible,
expert
scientific
advice
was
an important part of delivering public acceptance of
the measures and ‗flattening the curve‘ of daily cases.
The health and expert-driven responses
flattened the first wave of infection spread and
albeit a few bumps along the way including, cruise
ship and hotel quarantine mismanagement,
considered and targeted opening up measures were
progressively implemented. In the early stages in
March the country was on track with the USA and
the UK who subsequently, however, hit disastrous
numbers of cases and deaths, not abated even by the
end of the year. Only one month later Australia had
flattened the curve to below world best earlier and
sharp responses in New Zealand, South Korea,
Taiwan, Japan, and China.
Perhaps a note of complacency crept in to be
brought sharply to check as the unexpected and
significant ―second wave‖ hit during the Australian
winter in the state of Victoria in July occasioning
the most severe and prolonged lockdown (Mercer,
2020). A ―state of emergency‖ was declared for
a lockdown that lasted 112 days with 690 deaths
(Tsirtsakis, 2019) largely occurring in privatelyowned aged care. Nearly 75% of Australia‘s COVID
deaths have occurred in residential aged care —
the highest proportion by sector in the OECD
(Australian Royal Commission into Aged Care
Quality and Safety, 2020).
The Queensland Government subsequently
locked down Brisbane for a shorter but equally
effective period (Bennett, 2021). Political tensions
increasingly emerged, including over the relative
effectiveness and efficiency of state testing and
tracing capacity, whether elimination or suppression
was the appropriate success criterion, and
the opening up of interstate and indeed overseas
border restrictions.
With the successful suppression of the second
wave in Victoria by November, and of the smaller
second wave and lockdown in South Australia in
November (Davey, 2020) the economy resumed
opening up. The remaining politically controversial
significant border closing by Queensland to New
South Wales (NSW) was lifted in February 2021
(Lynch & Ward, 2021).
By the end of the year, cases and deaths were
virtually eliminated, the economy was opening up
and growth for the September quarter began
recovering
from
the
COVID-19
recession.
The country moved towards full suppression by
2020 with a cautious semblance of normality for
the holiday season and the New Year.

4. AUSTRALIA’S HEALTH RESPONSE
The first case of COVID-19 in Australia arrived with
a passenger from Wuhan on 25th January 2020
(Hunt, 2020) signalling the start of the pandemic
crisis in the country. The pandemic immediately
came hot on the heels of a prolonged drought
(Day, 2019) and unprecedented bushfires (Australian
Royal Commission into National Natural Disaster
Arrangements, 2020) that created national crises
and emergency management responses that were
generally found wanting in terms of both
preparedness and coordination of services delivery.
Morrison struggled to realize a leadership role
in a federal system where emergency response
services capabilities lie with state governments.
He was perceived as aloof from the 2019 bushfire
national emergency whilst on holiday in Hawaii
(Reimekis, 2019).
In response to COVID, Morrison exercised
personal leadership, stepped before the media and
the public accompanied by his Health Minister,
fronted by the government‘s Chief Medical Adviser.
The action was evidence and expert-based and
communicated daily, in detail, and extensively.
In daily public and media briefings, chief medical
officers explained and described the details of
the measures being taken and the science behind
them (Manning, 2020). Dr. Brendan Murphy, Chief
Medical Officer, convened the Australian Health
Protection Principle Committee (AHPCC) to inform
State and Territory Authorities and to coordinate
further action nationally.
Working closely with State Governments,
the PM for the first time constituted in mid-March
a novel, collaborative National Cabinet of federal and
state governments to tackle the crisis in a nationally
co-ordinated, inter-governmental decision-making
forum (Burton, 2020). Under Australia‘s federated
system of government, the six sovereign State
governments (along with two federal territories) are
constitutionally responsible for a range of public
services, including disaster management, transport,
police, education, environment, and particularly for
health and the management of the public health and
hospital delivery system. This represented a political
choice for co-operation over confrontation.
A range of strong measures was put in place
variously during the year, including, effective
restrictions and closures of public gatherings,
business activities, schools and universities, social
distancing, city-wide lockdowns, international and
state border closures and travel restrictions,
quarantine measures, personal hygiene and ―stay
safe‖ protocols, contact testing, tracing and tracking
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except WA which avoided one due primarily to
surging iron ore prices (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2020b).
As a result, all are carrying debt levels not seen
since the Second World War. Victoria, the worst-hit
state, had net debt doubled to $87 billion. NSW is
expected to carry net debt of $104 billion within
4 years. Commonwealth net debt is expected to
dwarf the states to reach a record $700 billion by
30th June 2021 and keep climbing. Total net debt
across all governments is forecast to be $1.4 trillion
in 2023–2024.
The climb out of deficit is likely to be
protracted with expectations that the economy will
not get back to pre-pandemic levels until at least
2022. Extended low growth will mean relatively high
unemployment. In real terms, inflation that is low, as
are interest rates, will likely outstrip already low
rates of wage growth. Australia is in the early state
of COVID-19 recovery.

5. ECONOMIC RESPONSES
The impacts of the health-based measures in
Australia on government, society, business, and
the economy were also immediate, and with
inevitably long-term consequences. They were also
severe, not least the closedown of businesses, loss of
jobs across the economy, and a huge fall in
economic growth leading to the first recession since
the early 1990s.
Within the first month of lockdown one million
jobs were lost and subsequently rose to 1.6 million.
These losses fell heavily on service sectors such as
retail, hospitality, tourism, culture, and education.
These hard-hit sectors were generally characterised
by less secure, lower-paying jobs, and dominated by
women and young people (Australian Bureau of
Statistics, 2020a). Notwithstanding, the recovery
from recession in the 2020 September quarter there
were still a million unemployed largely disguised by
continuing government wage subsidies.
Economic policies and programs were put in
place to take up the slack in the economy driven by
health measures, the deepest recession since
The Great Depression of the 1930s. In particular,
the government introduced unprecedented wage
subsidy and unemployment benefits measures
(known as JobKeeper), despite having previously
been ideologically consistently opposed to lifting
unemployment benefit levels, and to providing
government wage subsidies to employers. Similar to
other OECD countries (OECD, 2020a), measures were
taken to approve virtual annual general meetings
and ensure transparency through amending
continuous disclosure provisions (Australian Budget,
2020) with varying degrees of success.
Taxes were cut and incentives were provided
for businesses, particularly for housing and
construction sectors ―HomeBuilder‖, and consumers
lifting consumer savings levels to all-time highs
(Frydenberg, 2020) and lifting half a million people
out of poverty (Davidson, Bradbury, Wong, & Hill,
2020). The compulsory superannuation savings pool
of over $1 trillion was opened up for early cash
access withdrawals by wage earners with nearly
$3.5 million taking advantage (McKeown, 2020).
Nevertheless, as eventuated globally by the end
of 2020 the levels of inequality within countries
were exacerbated, including in Australia. The richest
recovered quickly with unprecedented support from
governments leaving a long slow haul to recovery for
the less secure and wealthy (Khadem, 2021).
The net effect of the government economic
interventions
was
to
dramatically
increase
government expenditures while the tax revenue base
was substantially reduced. Wage support and
welfare expenditures soared by nearly $60 billion
while personal and company tax receipts collapsed
by over $20 billion. Effectively, the government
deficit for 2019–2020 exploded to AUD$86 billion
as did the country‘s level of indebtedness
(Worthington, 2020) at 11% of GDP. This was
the highest since the end of the Second World War
and exceeded the post-global financial crisis deficit.
The promises made prior to the election were
undone as any Morrison government surplus
disappeared with the onset of the pandemic.
Federal and state budgets dropped significantly
into deficit as a result of the pandemic. All states
had deficits proportionate to their economies,

6. GOVERNANCE CAPACITY
We discuss Australia‘s successful response during
2020 to the pandemic crisis along the following
dimensions of governance capacity: preparedness or
analytical capacity; coordination; regulation; and
implementation or delivery capacity to provide
effective crisis management (Lodge & Wegrich, 2014).

6.1. Preparedness
The analytical dimension of crisis and transition
management capacity is realized in the first instance
to the state of preparedness to respond and
a capacity to deliver required outcomes. Across
a range of policy areas in Australia, there had been
many warnings in inquiries, reports, reviews, and
royal commissions, largely ignored over the years in
Australia about the growing potential for crises and
the need to reset policies and institutions. These
ranged from the need for fundamental economic
restructuring to federalism, national security, and to
a range of emerging social crises around poverty,
inequality, housing, aged care, indigenous rights,
and importantly in regard to climate change,
drought, and bushfires, and not least global
pandemics (Boyle, 2021). The general approach had
been belated, grudging, and piecemeal rather than
systematic and holistic reform; at best a ‗she will be
right‘ pragmatism and complacency.
In the year before the pandemic, the global
collective overall health security of 195 countries
including to respond to epidemics and pandemics
was assessed as ―remaining very weak‖ at an average
of 40/100 (Global Health Security Index, 2019).
While Australia has an enviable public health system
and ranked No. 3 (76/100) on its overall health
security (behind the USA 84/100 and the UK 78/100)
its specific preparedness for pandemic response
ranking was No. 10 (66/100) against the USA No. 2
(79/100, the UK No. 1 92/100). Perhaps the latter is
somewhat ironically given those two countries‘
significantly less effective response to COVID-19.
Internationally, over the past quarter-century,
there were many and widespread expert warnings of
potential global pandemics and the need for
preparedness that had been ignored by successive
governments and leaders (Graff, 2020). Lessons from
the SARS outbreak from 2003–2004 (Heymann,
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2004) did not produce a globally consistent, united,
dynamic response required in 2020.
The attitude and response to the coming of
COVID-19 from many leaders, in particular in
the USA, was that this was an unexpected,
out-of-left-field, unimaginable event, that came up
suddenly and surprisingly. This was no ―black swan‖
event but rather a ―pink flamingo‖, glaringly obvious
but widely ignored, knowable and known.
In the case of the various pandemic
preparedness plans in Australia effectiveness was
assessed pre-COVID in the range of 20%–75% with
many inconsistencies between plans. Health system
related issues were better addressed than critical
infrastructure and essential systems resilience.
According to Ifzwerth, Moa, and MacIntyre (2018)
―Pandemic response would be more effective if plans
were standardized, clear, and were to include
overlooked dimensions of pandemic‘s impact as well
as guidance for specific end users‖.
Australia escaped the worst of recent global
zoonotic pandemics such as SARS, mad cow disease,
and HN1 and appears not to have gained benefit
from the experiences of its regional Asia Pacific
neighbours, many of which, to their advantage,
learned from the warnings and experience that
informed their largely successful responses (Abuza,
2020). Despite earlier warnings about pandemics
and the need to develop contingency plans and
resources little had been put in place in Australia.
Stockpiles of emergency medicines, infection control
equipment, including PPE and ventilators, were
quickly shown to be insufficient, and local suppliers
and global supply chains were found wanting
(Pournader, 2020).
Perhaps a measure of ―pandemic fatigue‖ and
complacency had crept in after these earlier
pandemics had passed by relatively lightly in
Australia. It had been a world leader in pandemic
preparation in the 2000s and the work culminated in
two large national training exercises in 2006 and
the last in 2008 (Welch & Blucher, 2020).
On the other hand, Australia has a world-class
public health system underpinned by internationally
acknowledged medical research (Dixit & Sambasivan,
2018). The overall system is decentralized in
the sense that while the Commonwealth Government
funds a majority of health systems, responsibility
and delivery lies with the states. There had been
funding cutbacks and privatization over recent
decades (Kerr & Hendrie, 2018). The importance of
this capacity and its sensitivity was demonstrated in
the respective differences in the initial test, track,
and traceability between NSW and Victoria.
The latter had cut back expenditure on public health
in recent years and had a relatively centralised
system, fared less well initially than did the former.
The weakest link in the health system was in
the aged care sector. A Commonwealth rather than
State government responsibility it had been largely
privatised and, and was revealed to lack real
pandemic operational plans despite the boast by
a toothless aged care regulator that 99% of providers
were prepared in March 2020: ―It is very encouraging
that 99% of services reported having an infection
control outbreak management plan that covers the
key areas for COVID-19 preparedness‖2.
2

See Aged Care Quality Bulletin No. 15, March 2020
https://www.agedcarequality.gov.au/news/newsletter/aged-care-qualitybulletin-15-march-2020

The pandemic was the perfect storm that
magnified the dysfunctional regulation of a sector
that had woefully inadequate skilled staff, training,
and equipment.
The health response by the Federal Government
was the subject of the interim report of
the Australian Senate COVID commission interim
report. The Committee expressed its disappointment
that:
―[…] rather than accept its mistakes in leading
the health response and keeping aged care residents
safe, the government has repeatedly sought to avoid
taking responsibility and shift blame onto the states.
The Prime Minister also created confusion and
splintered federal cooperation by criticising state
and territory decisions to close schools and impose
domestic border restrictions‖ (Australian Senate
Select Committee, 2020).
The country‘s economic preparedness was
fiscally sound having experienced nearly thirty years
of sustained economic growth. Budget deficits were
minimal and falling while debt was low by world
standards. Notwithstanding many years of coalition
government fiscal restraint and political rhetoric of
the need for budget surpluses and lower debt levels,
they were able to respond with a swath of strong
economic measures to support businesses, people,
and the economy.

6.2. Coordination capacity: Decision-making and
collaboration
A relatively collaborative and consensual style was
adopted by the federal government in working with
the state governments, often of different political
parties, under the aegis of a specially established
National Cabinet. This met regularly and agreed with
broad policy approaches that were in stark contrast
to decades of bickering and haggling primarily over
money in long-standing commonwealth state
ministerial
forum
arrangements
headed
by
the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) that
were widely acknowledged as in need of reform.
These developments represented heightened
levels of government trust of expertise and between
levels of government. They demonstrated political
and ideological pragmatism and walking away from
pre-COVID
confrontational,
partisan
politics
especially between the federal and state government
on the one hand, and between the political parties
on the other. At the national level, the Opposition
party, minor parties, and independents largely went
along with the strategies adopted restricting
criticisms to shortcomings in delivery and
advocating for the more vulnerable caught up in
the crisis. Industry and business associations
supported the strategies and policies and were
generally compliant with regulations and restrictions
imposed.
Important as the nationally coordinated
strategy frameworks were particularly from
an economic and fiscal perspective, it was state
governments and their policies and activities that
mattered most on the ground. Local governments
that operate under state government authority
complied without exception to their respective state
government policies in respect of their local
community regulatory and community service
delivery responsibilities and made required
adaptations to suit local conditions.

at
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These
collaborative
and
decentralized
arrangements allowed for the strategies to change
and adapt as the crisis unfolded and in response to
local conditions. Strategies involved a changing mix
of flattening the curve, mitigation, through to test,
track and trace, lockdown suppression to hotspot
declarations,
interstate
border
closures
to
the overall easing of restrictions, and opening up
late in the year.
Overall, the government decision-making and
implementation were first and foremost driven by
the acceptance of expert scientific health advice in
a timely and effective manner. Success was all
the more impressive given the lack of pre-COVID
preparedness, planning, and operational exercises,
and the acceptance of such advice in the prevailing
conditions of deep uncertainty (Ansell & Boin, 2019).
The
evidence-based
knowledge
emerged
progressively and rapidly as the crisis unfolded
during 2020 in response to learning from measures
taken and subsequent relaxations. Effectiveness was
the result of coordination and collaboration between
the levels of government and state government‘s
strong health services delivery capacity.

7. GOVERNANCE LEGITIMACY
We discuss Australia‘s successful COVID-19 crisis
management experience during 2020 from the point
of view of governance legitimacy (Christensen,
Laegreid, & Rykkja, 2016) which turns on issues such
as
transparency,
accountability,
support,
expectations, and reputation that are required to
maintain citizens‘ trust in government in handling
the crisis.

7.1. Making sense of crisis: Appealing to solidarity
Appealing to a sense of social cohesion and personal
sacrifice for the public health good was a constant
government communications motif captured in
the idea of ―we are all in this together‖ coupled with
the utilitarian response.
Given the need to make decisions amid a ―fog
of uncertainty‖ in knowledge and the need to modify
measures as the pandemic unfolded and new data
came to hand daily, it was important for credibility
that government public briefings were frequent and
detailed. The communications framework as well as
being presented within the broader strategic
framework agreed at regular working meetings of
the National Cabinet was given added credibility and
transparency by the presentations of the health
and epidemiological experts.
There was an enhanced level of both vertical
hierarchical and horizontal transparency and
accountability (Schillemans, 2018). Central to
the responses were the health-based measures and
restrictions that were presented by the politicians in
an objective and measured public health terms.
The term ―an abundance of caution‖ was often used
in the justification of precautionary measures. It was
neither politicized nor dramatized beyond stressing
the serious unprecedented nature of this pandemic
threat to public safety and to the capacity of
the public health system to continue to provide
a high standard of health care, including the
availability of hospital and intensive care unit (ICU)
capacity, personal protective equipment (PPE) and
other necessary medical supplies.
Mistakes in the pandemic response were often
hindsight errors of judgement, while others
reflected a basic difference in the weighting of
public safety against economic costs, and
undoubtedly included an element of political
judgement and even ideology of weighing health as
against economic objectives. Some revealed
structural and systemic weaknesses that can only be
tackled if at all, in the long term. It is fair to observe
though, that despite these bumps along the road of
crisis management and largely learning by
experiment in the face of uncertainty, the thrust of
often severe, health evidence-based responses was
successfully
maintained
and
accepted
by
governments and the public.
The few, isolated cases of civil disobedience,
such as ―Bunnings Karen‖ (Nally & staff, 2020) were
widely publicized in the media and presented as
anti-social aberrations. Conspiracy theories and
disinformation did not proliferate as much as in
other countries (Spring & Wendling, 2020). Fines
were promptly issued by the police to individuals
and businesses in breach of regulations typically of
social distancing rules and border restrictions. A few
large parties at homes, restaurants, or on
the beaches were broken up by the authorities and

6.3 Delivery and regulatory capacity
The overall approach was led and coordinated
nationally from the top down but the state and
territory
governments
exercised
considerable
authority and discretion for regulation and delivery
under their sovereign responsibilities and capacities,
particularly with respect to health, education,
transport, business regulation, and law enforcement.
Two significant areas of structural weakness
were revealed in delivery and regulatory capacity
and accountability that were papered over in
the crisis but will require attention in the future.
Aged care and quarantine arrangements are both
constitutionally federal government responsibilities
where quality control and capacity were stressed
and where the federal government managed largely
to avoid its responsibilities and accountability in
part by shifting them to the states.
Overall, the strategy was implemented using
a blend of advice, guidelines, and mandatory
regulations. The mix varied over time and between
the federal and state jurisdictions. Public compliance
was underpinned by mutual trust between the public
and the government. There was only limited
pushback or shying away from the tough decisions
and measures that shut down businesses, closed
international
and
interstate
borders,
travel
restrictions, imposed citywide and local area
lockdowns, including curfews, social distancing,
building isolations, and suspension of all sporting,
arts and entertainment venues.
In
summary,
governance
capacity
was
pragmatically and successfully demonstrated within
a federal system in respect of delivery, regulation,
and coordination notwithstanding shortcomings on
pandemic management preparedness and lack of
clarity
of
respective
responsibilities
under
the constitution. The successful largely reactive and
agile response of governance arrangements to
the crisis serves to highlight the lack of surefootedness in anticipating problems but leaves open
the question of whether things might have been
even better handled with a governance culture of
preparedness and pro-activity (Barber, 2020).
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publicized in the media. Public protests and
demonstrations were few and typically small in
numbers, including a Black Lives Matters protest
that went ahead despite lack of formal approval but
in compliance with social distancing, hygiene,
and
masks
wearing.
A
lone,
high-profile
businessman-cum-politician, Clive Palmer, challenged
the Western Australian state government lockdown
power unsuccessfully in the courts (High Court of
Australia, 2020).
During the COVID crisis, governance capacity
was effectively harnessed to governance legitimacy.
Government action and services were seen to be
competent, able to deliver, to matter, and to make
a difference. Public trust even extended for example,
to large-scale acceptance and use of the COVID
tracing app developed at considerable cost but
proven flawed from the outset and ineffective in
the long term.

and experts noted in our discussion, unlike places
like the USA and the UK where populism and
authoritarianism failed disastrously to deliver even
competent COVID crisis management. Authoritarian
countries overall had no prolonged advantage in
suppressing the virus and their initial successes
converged over time with the generally laggard
performance of democracies (Lang & Lemahieu, 2021).
But post-COVID there is an underlying and
continuing deficit of distrust in the fundamentals of
democratic transparency and accountability that will
need to be addressed. Across the world, people are
widely dissatisfied with democracy but more divided
on whether the state is run for the benefit of all.
Those who believe elected officials do not care about
ordinary people are more dissatisfied with
democracy: the gap in Australia between those who
believe that public officials care (20%) and those
who believe that they do not care (54%), is
the second largest in the world (34%) (Connaughton,
Kent, & Schumacher, 2020).
In summary, governance legitimacy in crisis
management
not
only
requires
effective
decision-making and implementation but must also
be supported by sense-making and communication
to tap into and enhance an environment of mutual
trust between all stakeholders in government and
the community. The pragmatic evidence-based
and agile approach is taken in prevailing conditions
of deep uncertainty, experimentation and learning
by doing required nothing less for its success.
In Australia, during the COVID-19 pandemic
crisis in 2020, leaders and governments elevated
the meaning-making process and its communication
to new heights of practice in transparency and
frequency.
Ideologies and politicization were set aside in
the co-production between government and
community stakeholders of a narrative of ―public
health and safety‖ in a spirit of social cohesion.
The government succeeded by effectively connecting
governance capacity and delivery with legitimacy
and public acceptance in a co-production process
(Moon, 2020). People accepted personal restrictions
at personal costs in the interests of public health
and safety. New levels of mutual trust were
generated to deliver successful COVID crisis
management.

7.2. Trust in government
Pre-COVID, Australians‘ trust in politics, politicians,
and the government had been on a long-term
declining trend but lifted as the result of
the successful pandemic management during 2020.
The Prime Minister‘s personal popularity ratings
soared. The role of an opponent during a pandemic
emergency is a ‗no-win‘ situation politically. Generally,
the profile and approval ratings for the state and
territory premiers and governments also rose,
irrespective of the party in power. The usually pretty
intense ideological and party political differences
were seen to be set aside during the crisis
management and for the most part, they were.
However, as the year unfolded political
tensions also rose between federal and state, and
between state governments on issues particularly on
issues such as rates of loosening restrictions, border
closures, and caps on international arrival numbers.
Leadership was seen to be important in the eyes of
the public and its acceptance of often very difficult
public health-driven restrictions.
Confidence and trust among citizens were
generally high and steady. However, confidence in
the economy inevitably sagged with increasing
restrictions, lockdowns, unemployment, and as
the economy fell into recession. It recovered
unexpectedly fast late in the year as measured by
consumer confidence and spending due to effective
pandemic control, rising employment, and savings in
hand bolstered by government income support
arrangements. Business confidence was more
ambivalent, not least given continuing uncertainties
about on-again, off-again local outbreaks and
lockdowns, and despite considerable government tax
and investment incentives to business. Businesses
are clearly wary of making investments on
the supply side if consumers do not feel COVID-safe
and exhibit demand.
How sustainable this increase in trust of
government proves to be is an open question. Other
underlying measures of trust, particularly in regard
to issues of political corruption, lobbying, political
donations, and the vested interests of big business
remained on their pre-COVID falling trend lines.
The generally cooperative approach of governments,
agencies, and leaders was a vote of confidence in
the Australian democratic tradition and in the ability
of government to deliver important services. This
was notwithstanding the enhanced role of leaders

8. IMPACT ON SUSTAINABILITY
COVID presented opportunities and challenges in
Australia to embrace sustainability. The crisis
provided a unique opportunity to analyse in real
time the effects of a protracted ―major landscape
shock‖ on the trajectories of sustainability transitions
(Kanda & Kivimaa, 2020). For governments,
businesses and citizens the crisis has brought about
the lived experience of immediate and major
―disruptive‖ change (Foulis, 2020). Fundamental
shifts from one kind of socio-economic and
technical setting to another can occur over three
interactive and dynamic levels: 1) niches for
emerging radical innovations; 2) regimes of existing
institutional structures characterised by lock-in; and
3) exogenous pressures influencing both other levels
(Geels, 2002).
Sustainability transitions frequently occur and
mature over decades but as Kanda and Kivimaa
(2020) point out ―the COVID-19 outbreak offers
the possibility to question such assumptions by
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showing vividly that some systemic and deeply
structural changes in socio-economic systems can
under certain circumstances occur quite rapidly‖.
For the Morrison government, his party‘s reluctant
embrace of Paris climate change targets may see
change thrust upon their policy formulation rather
than persist with the denialism that has dominated
the policy agenda for the past decade. Any such
shift is also likely to be heavily influenced by
exogenous, international developments, pressures,
from the new American Presidential administration,
UK Prime Minister Johnson, and net-zero emission
commitments of Australia‘s neighbouring, Asian
trading partners.
Responses to the pandemic are likely to
accelerate structural shifts facilitated by new
technology and to encourage improvements in
governance systems, including through better crisis
preparedness, and enhanced public trust not only in
carbon-heavy Australia but elsewhere. These
developments would augur well not only for
the more effective handling of further global
pandemics but also for the climate and energy crises
and transitions facing the world. Rising to
the challenge of these new opportunities will require
a willingness to move in the recovery beyond
―business as usual‖ to a ―new normal‖ (Kivimaa &
Kern, 2016). It will also require a commitment to
long-term goals and planning so far resisted by
Australia. The OECD has called for governments to
learn from the COVID experience by ―building back
better‖ for handling resilience to future shocks,
enhancing wellbeing and inclusiveness, and
transitioning to sustainability (OECD, 2020b).
The COVID-19 crisis has devastated many
sectors but it has also ‗turbo-charged the internet‘
foreshadowing big structural changes in the economy.
The behaviour of workers, consumers, and
businesses changed during the pandemic, not least
in response to health-based restrictions and taking
advantage of digital technologies. The case of
GameStop in early 2021 symbolised the digital fight
between largely small investors against hedge fund
companies and demonstrated that casino capitalism
during a pandemic is not as easily tolerated
(Schroeder & Prentice, 2021) Changes in social
behaviour are likely to endure into and beyond any
longer-term recovery and reshape the economy.

2020 and the population accepted unprecedented
restrictions and a degree of coerciveness on its
personal and social freedoms. In a spirit of social
solidarity and mutual responsibility, there was
an only minor and isolated protest or dissent.
This high level of public compliance and conformity
was all the more remarkable an achievement given
the political trust deficit that had been declining for
many years and had reached unprecedented low
levels of 20% trust in government immediately
before COVID arrived. By the end of the year there
was a strong and significant reversion in trust of
institutions, politicians, and even the media however
if the government does not communicate in
a transparent and authentic way, then public
support will not be sustainable.
Government capacity for crisis management
was deployed in an efficient and effective manner in
a way that earned and built public trust.
Notwithstanding an arguable lack of preparedness,
the administration of public services from health
through economic measures demonstrated that
the public sector and government have a role and
can deliver when properly resourced.
Government capacity was also enhanced by
pragmatic political leadership and cooperation that
set aside previous political bickering and
institutional tensions and conveyed a unified picture
of leaders pulling together to act in the broader
national and public interest. There was broad
agreement on the common values that mattered,
namely, public health and safety, support for ―front
line workers‖, and fiscal relief for those who lost
business and employment. Ideology, politics, and
confrontation were largely set aside.
The creation of a National Cabinet of Prime
Minister and State Premiers was an important
innovation communicating unity of purpose and
coordination of capacity, much of which rested with
the States and Territories. Inevitable day-to-day
disagreements between the parties were more
readily accepted by the public in this context. This
governance style had not been on display during
the immediately
preceding
national
bushfires
emergency at the expense of public trust.
Adding
to
this
trust
in
governance
arrangements was the acceptance of medical expert
advice, the transparency, and effective public
communication of that advice. This was particularly
important in explaining and gaining acceptance for
frequently changing measures on ―learning by doing
basis‖ and in the face of a ―fog of uncertainty‖ in
scientific knowledge about the coronavirus itself.
In
the
―fog
of
uncertainty‖
surrounding
the coronavirus and its fast-evolving behaviour,
experimentation, and learning, there were inevitable
mistakes, mismanagement, overreaction, lack of
coordination, and poor communication along
the way. Striking a day-to-day perfect balance
between individual freedoms and public safety was
never going to be easy. What was important to
the success and legitimacy of governance was
an effective practical deployment of governance
capacity. Transparency and accountability were
strengthened by daily briefings and prompt reviews
of mistakes. There was public recognition and
acceptance that in a time of crisis unified and
coherent action by government and the state it is
better to err on the side of precaution and risk
aversion than not.
The question remains whether these lessons
learned in the successful crisis management of

9. CONCLUSION
The global experience with responses to COVID-19
during 2020 has shown how tendentious and
politicized has been the debate in many countries,
particularly in the USA, where it has been rooted in
an implied trade-off between health and economic
costs, and between individual freedom and social
responsibility.
This paper has examined Australia‘s successful
COVID-19 transformational crisis management as
a ―joint-production‖ of government capacity and its
legitimacy and public acceptability and considers
the lessons
for
post-pandemic
governance
sustainability in the face of future existential crises,
including global climate change. Australia ranked
among the best-performing countries in minimizing
impacts on public health especially cases and death
rates while at the same time minimizing economic
impacts and underpinning a quick recovery.
The government was able to act decisively and
effectively in responding to the pandemic during
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COVID-19 during 2020 will be taken forward in
a sustainable governance model to tackle systemic,
transformational challenges, including inequality,
social justice, and global climate change. The early
analysis and signs are not completely encouraging.
Most of the measures taken both as health-based
restrictions and as economic responses do break
with prevailing government policies and ideologies,
and with
conventional governance practice.
However, for the most part, the health-based
restrictions invoked existing emergency powers
legislation
with
clear
sunset
provisions.
The economic measures of financial support that
alleviated social injustice and inequality in poverty
and housing are also of clearly specified and limited
duration effect and will be phased out.
Overall, there is little evidence of any real,
potentially
long-lasting
innovative,
structural
changes at the political level. The possible exception
is the establishment of the National Cabinet that
now replaces the defunct and ineffective Council of
Australian Governments (COAG) as the primary
forum for inter-governmental decision-making.
The budgetary,
economic
recovery
measures
announced in October for the most part mark
a reversion to pre-COVID-19 ―business as usual‖
government policies with little evidence of grasping
the opportunities of learning and reform to ―build
better‖ for a sustainable future. The crisis
management lessons of preparedness, expert advice,
cooperation,
transparency,
accountability,
government service delivery capacity, common
purpose, clear communication, and planning show
little sign of impressing themselves on the Morrison
government or being taken forward at this
admittedly early stage of post-COVID recovery.
The considerably different lived experiences in
day-to-day life during the pandemic, in social
activity, work and business, are more likely to be
sustained in the longer term. In particular, personal
hygiene and distancing behaviour as well as
technology-enabled
activities
of
shopping,
entertainment, access to health care and education,
and working from home, reduced commuting and
travel, lower energy use. These might be
characterized as niche innovations but with some
potential to develop into long-term sustainable
changes with an accelerated move to an online
economy.
Having closed the long-standing and growing
institutional, political, and democratic ―trust deficit‖
during the pandemic, will the Australian political
classes and in particular, the Prime Minister and his
government, take the opportunity created by
the COVID crisis to build a new future? Or will they

revert to type, to their previous political practices
and culture, politicised squabbling and ideology,
advancing vested interests against the public good,
lacking transparency and accountability, and
dividing rather than unifying behind a common
purpose of ―public good‖?
As Australia‘s successful crisis-management
response to COVID-19 has underlined, sustainable
democratic governance requires the careful balancing
of capacity with legitimacy built on common purpose
and public trust. It is clear by comparison between
Australia on the one hand and the USA and the UK on
the other that capacity alone is necessary but not
sufficient; it must be complemented by legitimacy,
public trust, leadership, and social cohesion.
The necessary nature of the legitimacy
dimensions determines the effectiveness with which
capacity can be deployed. Furthermore, legitimacy
appears to be importantly determined by
the severity of restrictions proportional to capacity;
more capacity should require less severe restrictions
than lower levels of capacity.
The essentially cultural features of a society are
fundamental in successful pandemic management.
The stronger the social cohesion or social capital
the more resilient and accepting of emergency
restrictions tailored to health system capacity.
The Australian experience leaves us with
an intriguing
residual
question:
why
did
a conservative, small government PM feel able to
make such a U-turn in his government‘s ideological,
governance, economic and social policy positions in
the country‘s successful response to COVID-19?
He also delivered on COVID-19 even allowing for
the primary service delivery responsibilities and
roles exercised by state governments. The UK and
the USA leaders did not and with tragic results.
Could the difference lie in the relative strengths of
cohesion and solidarity of the respective societies
and the pressures that put on governments to act
accordingly? Would Australians have politically
accepted nothing less from their government, of
whatever political allegiance? Was the change
of allegiance vindicated by the accompanying surge
in Morrison‘s personal popularity and levels of trust
in government?
Looking forward from the COVID-19 2020 crisis
management experience, one thing that seems clear
is that across the board there is no ―going back to
normal‖. Disruption will accelerate, politics will
become more turbulent, pandemic habits will
persist, and crises will create opportunities. Effective
and sustainable governance in confronting crises
and emergencies is a matter of ethical and moral
choices by a society.
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